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Abstract: We extend Brander-Taylor’s model of development on Easter Island by adding
a resource subsistence requirement to people’s preferences, and a conservation incentive in
the form of a revenue-neutral, ad valorem tax on resource consumption. Adding subsistence
improves plausibility; makes overshoot and collapse of population more extreme, and the steady
state less stable; and allows for the possibility that statue building and erection will suddenly
stop, in line with the archaeological evidence. We explore a tax rate path which could have
almost completely prevented overshoot, and conjecture that the overall strength of this path
must rise when the subsistence level rises. ‡
(JEL Q20, N57, J10)
keywords: subsistence, renewable resources, conservation, Easter Island
∗Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT 0200, Aus-
tralia. Tel: +61 2 6125 4143, fax: +61 2 6125 0757, email: pezzey@cres.anu.edu.au; and Visiting Fellow,
Department of Economics, University of Bath, Bath BA2 7AY, U.K.
†Commonwealth Scientific and Industry Research Organization, Sustainable Ecosystems, GPO Box 284, Can-
berra, ACT 2601, Australia. email: John.Anderies@cse.csiro.au
‡Acknowledgments: We thank Sara Aniyar, Ed Barbier, Karl-Goran Maler, Pam Mason and an anonymous
referee for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
4
1. Introduction
Brander and Taylor (1998), hereafter BT, applied a “Ricardo-Malthus” model of people using
open-access renewable resources to explain the overall interaction between population and re-
sources on Easter Island in the south-eastern Pacific, between about 400 A.D. and the arrival of
European explorers in 1722 and 1774. In so doing, they sought to explain a pattern of economic
and population growth, resource degradation and subsequent economic decline, which mod-
ern archaeological and anthropological thinking believes to be more common than previously
thought. The central puzzle that greeted the first Europeans on Easter Island was the presence
of many huge statues carved of volcanic stone, with no explanation of how these could have
been erected. The island was treeless, and the population of about 3,000 was too small and
knew nothing about moving statues.
Recent evidence shows that the island was first settled by a small group of Polynesians in
about 400 A.D., and that the island supported a great palm forest then. Population probably
peaked at about 10,000 people around 1400 A.D., and declined thereafter.1 BT modeled the
forests and soil together as a single, renewable resource with logistic growth. This is consumed
by a human population whose fertility depends in a Malthusian way on resource consumption
per capita, making the model essentially a Lotka-Volterra one, with people as “predators” and
the resource as “prey”. People continuously divide their time between resource harvesting and
“manufacturing”. The latter means statue erection and other monument building in the case
of Easter Island, but in fact it could be anything done with non-harvesting time, as labor is the
sole input to manufacturing. People aim simply to maximize per capita utility at each instant.
With this model, BT simulated a growth of population, followed by a decline in the resource
stock and then a decline in population a few centuries later, which was a plausible fit to the
archaeological data just described.
A key question raised by BT was why there was no institutional adaptation to prevent
the collapse of the system. There are many examples of open-access systems where common
property management regimes can be developed to prevent the type of degradation observed in
the BT model (Ostrom, 1990). Key elements that would affect successful institutional reform,
as BT noted, include the population’s level of agreed-upon understanding of the problem, and
the underlying behavioral attributes of the individual agents. Here we extend the BT model
1As BT noted, these figures are quite uncertain. Estimated figures for the population maximum range from
7,000 to 20,000, and figures for the date of this maximum vary by a century or so. However, within this range of
uncertainty, the qualitative problem we analyze here remains unchanged.
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to include both a subsistence requirement and a mechanism for resource conservation, and we
explore how these two features might affect the possibility of institutional adaptation. Some
alternative new features have been suggested to us, but they appear to add more mathematical
complexity than our chosen two, without altering the latter’s basic insights. So we have left
these alternatives for further work, though we briefly outline them in our conclusions.
Our reason for adding a subsistence requirement is that the Cobb-Douglas utility function
used by BT resulted in people dividing their time between resource harvesting and manufac-
turing in fixed proportions, even though this results in hunger and population decline when
resources are scarce. We use a utility function with a minimum subsistence level of resource
good consumption, which avoids the implausibility of this fixed-proportion choice. It also makes
the model less stable and more prone to overshoot and collapse, and so better able to explain
the complete cessation of statue manufacture believed to have happened after about 1500 on
Easter Island.
The importance of subsistence in economics is widely recognized (see Sharif (1986) for a
survey), and its impact on growth patterns has been explored by authors such as Steger (2000).
But his and other analyses made more conventional assumptions than ours: their productive
capital stock was physical rather than natural; instantaneous utility depended only on con-
sumption; the rate of population growth was exogenous; intertemporal utility was maximized;
and the timescale of interest was much shorter than the 1300 or so years that we consider. We
hope our analysis will lead to useful insights for contemporary development economics, but the
challenge of bridging the paradigms is considerable. In particular, it will not be easy to choose
an appropriate intertemporal utility function when population growth is treated as endogenous,
as it probably should be in an economy near subsistence.
Our second new element is some basic modeling of a “resource conservation” institution,
which Ricardo-Malthus-like societies might possibly use to avoid overshoot and collapse. For
ease of computation we model this as an instantaneous, revenue-neutral, ad valorem tax on
resource extraction. We do not explore how cultural mechanisms roughly equivalent to the tax
might evolve and work in a simple, Easter-Island-like economy. Our aim is to explore some
general characteristics of a tax path which avoids overshoot, and its dependence on people’s
underlying behavior.
Section 2 and the Appendix derive our theoretical results with both a subsistence level of
resource and a revenue-neutral resource tax. Section 3 uses simulations to examine the effects of
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subsistence alone (with no tax) on stability in general, and manufactures in particular. Section 4
simulates effects of the chosen tax profile on the economy, and the influence of the subsistence
requirement on the characteristics of the tax profile. Section 5 concludes and suggests directions
for further work.
2. The Theoretical Effect of Subsistence and Taxation on The
Easter Island Economy
Our closed, population-resource model is the BT model in all but two respects. First, our
representative consumer is assumed to have an instantaneous utility function
u(h,m) = (h− hµ)βm1−β; 0 < β < 1, hµ > 0 (1)
where h and m are individual consumptions of the resource good and of manufactures. The
positive parameter hµ is a subsistence or minimum required level of resource consumption, a
feature which seems appropriate for studying population collapse in a resource-based society like
Easter Island. BT omitted this, i.e. they had u = hβm(1−β). Total resource and manufactures
consumptions are H = Lh and M = Lm, where L is the total population at any time (all time
arguments are suppressed). Total “manufactures” M are produced with constant returns to
scale using only labor, M = LM , where LM is the total labor time spent on manufactures. So
we could equally well think of the “other good” m as including culture and/or leisure as well
as tangible artifacts. For all interior solutions, manufactures are taken as the numeraire (i.e.
with price = 1) so that the wage rate w = 1, and with total time normalized at 1, total wage
income is also 1. The price of the resource in terms of manufactures is p.
Our other departure from BT is that all resource consumption is taxed collectively at an
ad valorem rate t, with the revenue being all returned to people as a lump-sum subsidy T . In
simple societies without formal governments and taxes, the tax would have to be thought of
as a disincentive to “excessive” resource consumption enacted by social pressures or taboo, but
we do not discuss the much-studied and difficult problem of how such customs might arise or
be enforced.
At each moment, the individual consumer myopically maximizes utility (1) subject to the
budget constraint
(1 + t)ph+m = 1 + T. (2)
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while the condition for overall revenue neutrality (adhered to collectively, but not perceived by
any individual) is
tph = T. (3)
The resulting interior and corner solutions for per capita manufactures and resource consump-
tions (see Appendix for calculations) are respectively
h =
{ β(1−phµ)
(1+t−βt)p + hµ if p <
1
hµ
1
p otherwise
(4)
m =
{
(1−phµ)(1−β)(1+t)
1+t−βt if p <
1
hµ
0 otherwise
(5)
The tax rate t shifts the balance of the interior solutions from resource consumption towards
manufactures, but has no effect on the corner solution, as one would expect intuitively.
Next, following BT, we assume a Schaefer resource harvest function H = αSLH , where
α > 0 is the harvestability parameter, S is the resource stock and LH = L − LM is the labor
used in resource harvesting. Under open access conditions, any rent (user cost) of the resource
is ignored, and the price of the resource is just the value of labor expended per unit of resource
harvested:
p =
wLH
H
=
1
αS
(6)
(4) and (5) then become
h =
{
β(αS−hµ)
1+t−βt + hµ if αS > hµ
αS otherwise
(7)
m =
 (1−
hµ
αS
)(1−β)(1+t)
1+t−βt if αS > hµ
0 otherwise
(8)
As in BT, the resource carrying capacity of the society’s land is K, the intrinsic rate of resource
growth is r, and the rate of change S˙ of the resource stock is natural growth G(S) = rS(1−S/K)
minus total harvest H = Lh from (7):
S˙ = rS(1− S/K)− Lh, r,K > 0 (9)
Finally, the population growth rate is a Malthusian fertility term proportional to per capita
resource consumption, F (H,L) = φHL , φ > 0, minus a base rate of decline, which for neatness
8
is written as δ (> 0) here rather than (d− b) as in BT.2 Thus3
L˙
L
= φh− δ. (10)
Throughout we assume that the parameters satisfy BT’s condition (13)
K >
δ
φαβ
(11)
which guarantees the existence of a steady state at which the human population is positive. We
denote this and the corresponding steady state resource population as L∞ and S∞, respectively.
The steady state is found by setting S˙ = L˙ = 0, though it is not necessarily a stable equilibrium,
as we discuss below. The Appendix shows that the steady state resource stock then depends
on our new features t, the tax rate, and hµ, the subsistence level, according to:
S∞(t, hµ) =

(1+t−βt)( δ
φ
−hµ)
β
+hµ
α if
δ
φ > hµ
δ
φα otherwise.
(12)
while the steady state population is
L∞(t, hµ) =
rφ
δ
S∞(1− S∞
K
) (13)
with per capita resource and manufactures consumption being respectively
h∞ =
δ
φ
and m∞(t, hµ) = 1− δ
φαS∞
. (14)
With a little manipulation, equation (12) shows that provided δφ > hµ, a positive resource tax
will result in a higher steady state resource stock, while a positive subsistence requirement will
have the opposite effect. Notice from (7) and (12) that as hµ increases, the tax has less effect
on the instantaneous per capita harvest rate h and the long run equilibrium resource stock S∞.
Total steady state resource and manufactures H = Lh and M = Lm follow immediately
from the above results. Note how the corner (δ/φ ≤ hµ) solutions can be found intuitively from
the interior solutions: just set the resource preference parameter β = 1, thus “forcing” all labor
to be spent on resource harvesting and none on manufacturing.
2Like BT, we do not distinguish between the effects of nutrition on birth rates (via fecundity and social
customs) and on death rates (via disease and perhaps infanticide). See Anderies (1999) for a model that makes
this distinction.
3One might argue instead that L˙
L
= φ(h− hµ)− δ on the (debatable) grounds that it should be only resource
consumption above the subsistence level hµ that contributes to increased fertility. But since both equations are
linear in h, all this does is make the algebra slightly simpler, and change the interpretation of some parameters.
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3. The Effect of the Subsistence Requirement
Here we are interested only in how the subsistence consumption level hµ affects the dynamics
of the model, and allows for an abrupt disappearance of monument-building (“manufactures”
here) from a culture. We treat people as individuals, and so ignore the possibility of collective
resource conservation, and set the tax rate t = 0 in the formulae in Section 2.
The effect of the subsistence requirement is fairly easy to understand intuitively. BT’s results
follow directly from the above by setting hµ = 0, and thus ignoring all the corner solutions. In
BT, no matter how low the resource S gets as a result of harvesting, and thus no matter how
negative the population growth rate φβαS−δ (from (7) and (10) with hµ = t = 0) becomes as a
result of famine, people still spend a fixed proportion m = 1−β of their time on manufactures.
This means that if resources per person become scarce, population stops growing fairly quickly,
putting less pressure on the resource.
However, for people still to carve statues while babies starve seems unlikely behavior. Our
solution allows the more plausible reaction that as the resource stock S falls, equations (7)
and (8) force labor to be reallocated from the manufacturing to the resource sector. Once
the resource stock falls below hµ/α, and hence the maximum per capita harvest falls below
the subsistence level hµ, manufacturing effort stops altogether. In a sense, society has then
“collapsed”, and all human effort is spent on resource harvesting. Even before this, the greater
preference for resources caused by hµ > 0 means that population growth tails off less rapidly as
resources per capita decline, harvesting pressure on the resource is greater, and the overshoot
of population is greater, as we shall see.
From (12), the end of manufacturing may be temporary if δ/φ ≥ hµ, since there is then an
interior (m > 0) steady state, which may be stable and to which the population may ultimately
converge. But if δ/φ < hµ, manufacturing will never reappear: in this case, a finite population
can be sustained forever, but it stays in a true subsistence state with all time spent on harvesting.
Such distinctions may be useful in categorizing types of interaction between past civilizations
and their environments.
As an illustration, Figure 1 shows resource stock S, per capita manufactures m, population
L and total manufactures M over the period 400-1900 A.D. for the simulation in BT’s section
IV, with parameters as in the first column of Table 1, of the ecological-economic history of
Easter Island.
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Table 1:
Summary of model parameters.
Parameter
Values from BT
used in Figures 1,
2, 3, 7, and 8
Values used in
Figure 5
Fertility, φ 4
Resource taste, β 0.4
Base rate of population decline, δ 0.1
Initial population, L(0) 40
Harvestability, α 0.00001 0.0000078
Resource intrinsic growth rate, r 0.04 0.035
Carrying capacity, K 12000 11000
Subsistence resource consumption, hµ 0 or 0.015 0.018
Equilibrium resource level, S∞ (no tax) 4000 4551
Equilibrium population level, L∞ (no tax) 4267 4269
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800
History (400-1900 A.D.)
P
op
ul
at
io
n/
re
so
ur
ce
s/
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
s
Figure 1:
Population (solid line), resources (dashed line), and manufactures (dotted line) on Easter
Island for BT’s model.
Figure 2 shows the same simulation, changed only by a positive subsistence requirement
hµ = 0.015. Note firstly, the earlier and much greater population overshoot (to about 16,000
rather than 10,000) which occurs “with subsistence”; secondly, the much more severe falls in
population and resource stocks thereafter; and thirdly, the complete halt in manufacturing
which lasts from about 1150 till 1650, by which time the resource (but not yet population) has
begun to recover.
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Figure 2:
Figure (A) shows the population (solid line), resource stock (dashed line), and manufacturing
output (dotted line) with subsistence hµ = 0.015. Figure (B) shows the labor allocation to
manufacturing over time as a proportion of the total labor force for the BT model (dashed
horizontal line), and for hµ = 0.015 (solid line).
Subsistence also causes differences not just initially, but also in long-term stability behavior.
Figure 3 shows just population for the Figure 1 and 2 simulations with a compressed timescale,
which extends out as a “prediction” of what would have happened up to 4900 A.D. with no
outside intervention. Note how much more rapidly (if “rapidly” is the right word for changes
happening over several centuries) the damped oscillations of population converge when there is
no subsistence. Indeed, suppose the initial population of Polynesian adventurers had reached
Easter Island at least three thousand years earlier, and the BT model had been correct. Then
Captain Cook would have found a very stable population and culture, which might have become
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a historical example of sustainable resource use much admired by modern environmentalists!
But under the subsistence model, evidence of quite separate eras of monument-building (and
maybe no current building) might have been found. So a subsistence requirement causes not
just greater initial overshoot, but a much slower damping of the ecological-economic system.
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Figure 3:
Population for the BT model (dotted line) and subsistence model (dashed line).
Furthermore, when the subsistence level hµ rises above a certain threshold h
†
µ, which de-
pends in a complex way on the parameters, the model behavior fundamentally changes. For
hµ < h
†
µ, the steady state is a stable equilibrium in the (S, L) phase space, towards which
the system will converge either monotonically or through a series of damped oscillations. For
hµ > h
†
µ, the steady state is unstable and the system will converge to a limit cycle circling
around the steady state. The transition between the two behavior modes at hµ = h
†
µ is a Hopf
bifurcation (Kuznetsov, 1995), and as hµ rises through h
†
µ, the real parts of the two eigenvalues
of the Jacobian of the system change from negative to positive. This change in the real parts
of the eigenvalues from negative to positive weakens the natural damping in the model possibly
leading to more extreme fluctuations.
Using the pseudo arclength continuation technique found in the software package Au-
to (Doedel, 1981), we calculate that for the BT set of parameters, h†µ = 0.0177. Figure 4,
computed from Auto, plots the decline in the steady state population L in (21) as hµ increases
(shown as a continuous fine line), the bifurcation point h†µ, and the upper and lower values of
the limit cycle which occur for hµ > h
†
µ (dark circles). Because the value of hµ = 0.015 chosen
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for Figures 2 and 3 is getting rather close to h†µ, the real parts of the system eigenvalues are
then quite close to zero, though still negative. This means that though the steady state is still
stable, convergence is much slower than with hµ = 0, as already shown by Figure 3. For values
of hµ > h
†
µ, the system will never converge to the steady state, and the oscillations will be even
more pronounced than those shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 4:
Bifurcation diagram showing fundamental change in long term behavior as hµ is varied. Long
term behavior changes from a stable equilibrium (solid line showing the value of the long run
stable population) to a large amplitude limit cycles (heavy circles showing the maximum and
minimum population levels attained over a cycle.
Finally, can our model produce a reasonable fit to what is known of Easter Island history,
rough as this is? The parameters in the second column of Table 1, some of which are the same as
BT’s, while others are “tweaked” but still plausible, give the simulation of resource, population,
manufactures and manufactures per capita shown in Figure 5. With the changed parameters
the bifurcation threshold can be calculated as h†µ = 0.0219, so the chosen subsistence level
h = 0.018 is below this, but not by much. Also our δ/φ = 0.025 > hµ. The steady state of this
simulation is thus a stable, interior one, but convergence in fact takes several thousand years
of drastic population-resource cycles. The parameter set was chosen so that three features of
Figure 5 all fit BT’s summary of the rough data available for Easter Island at least as well
their own simulation. Figure 5 gives a good fit to the timing and size of the peak population,
the population on European contact around 1720 and 1770, and the complete cessation of
manufacturing around 1500. The last of these is is modeled better by Figure 5 than by BT’s
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non-subsistence model in Figure 1, where manufacturing M in 1500 is still more than half the
peak reached around 1250. Abrupt halts in manufacturing (i.e. monument-building) have also
been noted for other lost civilizations such as the Maya, so the subsistence effect may explain
a more general phenomenon.
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Figure 5:
Figure (A) shows the population (solid line), resource stock (dashed line), and manufacturing
output (dotted line) for the subsistence model with the parameter set in column two of
Table 1. Figure (B) shows the labor allocation to manufacturing over time as a proportion of
the total labor force for the BT model (dashed horizontal line), and corresponding to Figure
(A) (solid line).
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4. An Institution to Conserve the Resource
BT gave a verbal discussion of whether institutions governing fertility or resource use, which
were absent from their formal model, could possibly have been developed in order to save the
Easter Island civilization from overshoot and collapse. Here we give a quantitative treatment
of how effective one type of institution, a collective incentive to conserve the resource, might be
in doing this. But we aim neither to explain how such an incentive could have been evolved,
nor to improve the fit of our model to data for Easter Island (or anywhere else).
One reason for avoiding this obvious but daunting challenge is that there is as yet little
agreement about the main factors at work, at least as revealed by the secondary sources we
have consulted. BT (p133) suggested that it would be difficult for a society like Easter Island to
develop effective institutions in a single boom and bust cycle, especially given that the maximum
rates of resource degradation are actually quite low (at most 5% over a typical human lifetime in
Figure 1), and that the 40 to 60 years needed for a palm tree to mature meant that reafforestation
efforts “would almost never have been of direct benefit to the cultivators”. In contrast, Ponting
(1991, Ch. 1) suggested that the Easter Islanders must have realized how much environmental
degradation had occurred, but stressed the role of competition and conflict (including warfare)
between rival clans in stopping any collective, island-wide response from developing. Further
research into the interaction in resource-based societies between actual and perceived resource
degradation, and political structure, would therefore be welcome, though undoubtedly not easy.
Our more limited aim here is to find what kind of institutions could, if adopted, avoid over-
shoot and collapse. This may provide some useful tools for further analyzing the interesting but
difficult questions which inevitably arise when one asks if some simple resource-based societies
achieved a form of “static sustainability”. (This is the idea in Pezzey (1992) of a society keep-
ing both its population and its resources fairly constant, whether by evolutionary accident or
by conscious design, while using only renewable resources and constant technology.) One such
question (not addressed here) is under what circumstances sustainable societies can persist de-
spite the presence of neighboring, unsustainable ones. Given how modern environmental groups
often promote the ethics of resource use that prevailed or still prevail in statically sustainable
societies, this topic has some relevance for the formation of modern environmental policies.
An associated question that we do address is how varying the subsistence requirement (i.e.
varying a parameter that affects individual behavior) influences the effectiveness of the institu-
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tions that can avoid overshoot and collapse. Again this has some relevance for forming modern
environmental policies to control resource consumption.
Our modeling is confined to the ad valorem, revenue-neutral tax analyzed in Section 2,
and we have not considered any kind of constraint on fertility. The main challenge is to find
a path of the tax rate over time that might improve the dynamic evolution of society. But
what might such “improvement” mean? Koopmans (1977) emphasized that when population is
endogenously determined, as here, agreeing on a dynamic objective raises difficult philosophical
questions. Is society’s “benefit” at each time seen as population, total utility, or per capita
utility? Would it be just the steady state level of one of these variables that is the maximand,
or the discounted present value of it, as an anthropologist like Alvard (1998) concludes, along
with most growth economists? If the latter, what discount rate should be used? Or should
population simply never decline, thus avoiding overshoot (one of several possible definitions of
sustainable development for a society)?
Combining an infinite set of time paths of the tax rate with several alternative objectives
allows endless possible explorations. So we simplify by assuming that an institution to conserve
resources could include three components:
• Some type of threshold event or state that, once crossed, would stir the population to
take action;
• Some speed of response, or “relaxation time”, over which the population takes action once
they have decided to act; and
• Some vision of what the agents want their long term society to look like.
A simple tax schedule that crudely incorporates these components is
t =
tmax
1 + exp(−q(1− L
Λ
))
(15)
where tmax, q, and Λ are positive constants. The “design” behind (15) is that the function
1
1 + exp(−q(1− L
Λ
))
(16)
“switches on” from near 0 to near 1 as the population L increases. The parameter Λ marks
the population level at which expression (16) has a value of 0.5, and thus the halfway point
of the switching-on process. The parameter q controls the width of the band around Λ during
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which the switching on occurs, i.e. how sharply the tax switches on. Figure 6 illustrates the
behavior of the tax schedule for tmax = 1, Λ = 4000, and three different values of q, 4, 7, and
10, corresponding to increasingly sharp responsiveness, respectively.
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000
Population
T
ax
Λ
Figure 6:
Tax rate in (15) versus population for Λ = 4000, tmax = 1, and three different values of q: 4
(solid line), 7 (dashed line), and 10 (dotted line).
We assume that agents are motivated to take action by population pressure, but a tax
schedule based on resource decline works in a similar fashion. The important point is that
society responds to the state of the system. For high values of q, the response of an increasing
tax rate is rapid, but the population pressure must be higher before this starts to occur. For
low values of q, a noticeable tax rate starts at lower population pressures, but increases more
slowly over time. Thus by adjusting the two parameters Λ and q, numerous scenarios can be
modeled for when and how rapidly society starts responding. Finally, the maximum value that
the tax could ever approach is tmax, so this measures the overall strength of the tax.
Above we reached no firm conclusion on an ideal dynamic goal for society. However, we
identified avoiding any population decline as one possible goal. In practice, we chose the tax
path parameters by trial and error in order to curb population overshoot and collapse as much
as possible, and Figure 7 shows one outcome of this approach: the effect of the tax path (15)
with tmax = 1, Λ = 4000, and q = 6 on the dynamics of the original BT model (with no
subsistence). In choosing our tax path we thus pay little attention to optimizing steady state
variables. For example, tmax, the asymptotic value of our chosen tax path bears no relation to
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the value t∗ which would maximize steady state population L∞ in the cases considered.4 For
the standard BT parameters (hence hµ = 0), t∗ = −0.0667, whereas for the parameters we will
use for Figure 7, tmax is about 1.15. Fortunately, for meaningful parameter ranges including
BT’s parameter set, steady state population turns out to be rather insensitive to the tax rate.
In Figure 7, the tax path is very successful in smoothing out the initial overshoot of popu-
lation, as shown by comparing in Figure 7(A) the original population and resource trajectories
(light lines) with those when the tax regime is in effect (bold lines). Figure 7(B) shows the
tax rate (solid) and the per capita resource consumption path (dotted) for both cases. As the
population approaches 4000, the tax rate kicks in and drives consumption down earlier than in
the case with no tax (bold dotted line versus light dotted line in Figure 7(B)). This prevents per
capita consumption of resource goods h from falling much below the zero population growth
level of δφ = 0.025.
Figure 8 shows the effect the subsistence requirement (hµ > 0) has on the system. Fig-
ure 8(A) shows the population trajectories for the same parameters as in Figure 7, except for
hµ = 0.015 instead of 0, and now three different values of tmax: 0, 1, and 3, shown respectively
by the solid, dotted, and solid bold lines. The tax strength tmax = 1 that nearly stabilized
the system with hµ = 0 is now far too weak to prevent overshoot. Instead, a tax regime with
a maximum of about 3 times that level is required to achieve a fairly smooth approach to a
long term equilibrium. Some local stability analysis (see Appendix) combined with numerical
experiments leads us to conjecture that the value of tmax required to avoid overshoot always
rises nonlinearly with hµ. For example, with hµ = 0.02, a tmax of about 6 is needed to avoid
overshoot and collapse. So the larger the level of subsistence needed, the more drastic the
institutional action required to avoid overshoot and collapse.
This result can be interpreted in two ways. The first is a fairly straightforward interpretation
from the mathematics. Recall from (12) that the tax affects only interior solutions. Increasing
hµ increases the chance of a corner solution with all labor working in the resource sector. The
chance of a corner solution simply reduces the size of the area in state space where the tax
can act, reducing its effectiveness. This is shown graphically in Figure 8(B), which shows the
4By differentiating L∞, from (13) and (12), with respect to t, one can show that the steady-state-maximizing
tax rate is
t∗ =
β(αK−2hµ)
2(δ/φ−hµ) − 1
1− β . (17)
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Figure 7:
Figure (A) shows resource (dashed) and population (solid) trajectories without (light) a tax
and with (bold) the resource tax schedule with tmax = 1, Λ = 4000, and q = 6 for the original
BT parameters. Figure (B) shows the corresponding tax (solid) and resource consumption
(dashed) trajectories without (light) and with (bold) the tax.
fraction of total labor in the resource sector for the three cases above. The solid line shows the
case for tmax = 0, in which resource scarcity progressively drives labor into the resource sector
until the entire population is engaged there. The dotted line depicts the case for tmax = 1. Here
when the bioresource is not scarce, the tax effectively moves labor out of the resource sector.
However, this effect is temporary as subsequent resource scarcity drives labor back into this
sector. Finally, the bold line shows the case for tmax = 3, in which the effect of the tax is strong
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Figure 8:
Figure (A) shows population trajectories without (dashed) and with tax (tmax = 1 (dotted)
and tmax = 3 (bold), with Λ and q as before) for the model with subsistence hµ = 0.015.
Figure (B) shows the corresponding fraction of labor in the resource sector over time.
enough to reduce labor in the resource sector permanently. The key is that the tax must reduce
labor in the resource sector sufficiently to prevent the future population growth that will drive
labor back into the sector.
The second interpretation of this result has to do with the way a population might attempt to
address resource scarcity. A larger subsistence requirement reduces the willingness of consumers
to substitute manufactures for resource consumption. It thereby forces society to try to solve
resource scarcity problems simply by exploiting the scarce resource more intensively, and this
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makes collective action to prevent overexploitation more difficult. In this light, this result
may have implications for a modern industrial society which responds to food scarcities by
forever intensifying agriculture. In the model, society substitutes labor for a declining renewable
resource, while a modern society substitute human-made capital and depletable resources (oil,
coal, etc.) for a declining renewable resource. In both cases, the effect on the resource base
is the same. Ever increasing useful work (human energy or fossil fuel energy) is required to
produce food with an accompanying ever decreasing quality of the natural resource base. Our
analysis suggests that this tendency may have made institutional reforms more difficult.
Whether or not a tax scheme like (15) would be selected by an evolutionary contest between
competing societies is quite another matter. In the case of societies geographically close to
each other (clearly not applicable to Easter Island), a society following the no-tax path in
Figure 8 might, when it reaches its initial peak in population, be able to conquer a nearby, more
sustainable society following the tax path, and thus commandeer fresh resources to prevent its
own impending collapse. The effect of hµ on the model suggests that many populations may
have failed to adapt internally to resource scarcity, and thus could survive only by conquering
neighboring societies. Such considerations might help explain the history of expansionary versus
sustainable development in the pre-history of the world.
5. Conclusions
We have offered a refinement of Brander and Taylor’s (1998) innovative analysis of the devel-
opment of a myopic, Malthusian human society which depends solely on a renewable natural
resource with a finite carrying capacity. Adding a minimum subsistence level of resource con-
sumption to the typical individual’s utility function improves both psychological realism, and
consistency with what is roughly known about the overshoot and collapse of the Easter Island
society which erected the famous, giant stone statues. For a plausible choice of parameters, the
subsistence requirement results in a development path on which “manufactures” (statue carving
and erection) cease suddenly after about 1500 A.D., in accordance with the archaeological data;
whereas manufactures go on being produced in significant quantities in Brander and Taylor’s
model.
More generally, by using bifurcation analysis combined with numerical experiments, we have
shown that the subsistence requirement destabilizes development, because it results in a less
effective response to declining resources: people try to maintain their resource consumption,
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rather than allowing population to decline faster, so overshoot and collapse becomes more
severe. A hypothetical, collective incentive to conserve the resource (modeled as a particular
time path of an ad valorem tax on resource harvest) was shown to exert a restabilizing influence
on development, largely preventing overshoot and speeding convergence to the steady state, if
a stable one exists. The severity of the tax rate required to achieve this depends positively on
the strength of the subsistence requirement, so a higher requirement reduces the chances that
collective action could prevent resource degradation. Further work would be worthwhile on the
effects of other tax paths, and on the much more complex question of what sort of community
objectives over time would thereby be maximized.
Several other specific developments BT’s basic model have been suggested during our work
on this paper. One, mentioned in our second footnote, would be to include effects of per capita
nutrition h independently on the death rate as well as on the birth rate. Another is that
depleting resource stocks on Easter Island, specifically of trees, might have caused irreversible
soil erosion, thus permanently reducing the carrying capacity K. A third idea is that as well
as labor inputs, statue manufacture may have needed substantial inputs of resources, such as
tree trunks for use as rollers (Ponting 1991, p5). A simple way to model this would be to
make total harvest linearly dependent on manufactures as well as population, H = ηM + Lh
for some constant η. Fourthly, perhaps it was the total stock of statues as much as the flow
of their manufacture which gave a religious or cultural reward to the inhabitants, so that
the utility function could be modeled as u(h,
∫
M(t)dt,m). Finally, the model could perhaps be
applied to other collapsed civilizations noted in BT’s Section V, such as the Mayans, the ancient
Mesopotamians, and the Chaco Anasazi. All these developments seem worth exploring in
further work, but they appear to involve more complex calculations than, and not to undermine
the broad significance of our chosen two features of a subsistence requirement and a resource
conservation incentive.
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Appendix
Consumer optimization
To derive results (4) for h and (5) for m from the constrained optimization problem defined by
(1), (2) and (3), define the Lagrangian
L ≡ (h− hµ)βm1−β + λ[1 + T − (1 + t)ph−m] (18)
First order conditions for an interior solution are:
∂L
∂h
=
βu
h− hµ − λ(1 + t)p = 0 ⇒
u
λ
=
(1 + t)p(h− hµ)
β
(19)
∂L
∂m
=
(1− β)u
m
− λ = 0 ⇒ u
λ
=
m
(1− β) (20)
(2) and (3) ⇒ m = 1− ph (21)
(20) and (21) ⇒ u
λ
=
1− ph
1− β (22)
(19) and (22) ⇒ (1 + t)p(h− hµ)
β
=
1− ph
1− β (23)
which after routine algebra gives (4) and then (5). Since a negative amount of manufactures is
physically impossible, the condition for this interior solution to apply is
p <
1
hµ
(24)
If (24) does not hold, then a corner solution (in which the tax rate plays no part) applies instead:
h =
1
p
, m = 0. (25)
Steady state
To derive the steady state for S in (12), L in (13), h and m in (14) corresponding to the first
value of S∞(t, hµ) in (12), setting L˙ = 0 in (10) gives h immediately. Using (7) then gives
φ
[
β(αS − hµ)
1 + t− βt + hµ
]
= δ (26)
⇒ αS − hµ =
(1 + t− βt)( δφ − hµ)
β
(27)
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from which (12) and (13) follow by straightforward algebra, including setting S˙ = 0 in (9) (with
no check if the resulting steady state is stable). Next,
(12) ⇒ 1− hµ
αS
= 1− hµ
(1 + t− βt)( δφ − hµ)/β + hµ
(28)
=
(1 + t− βt)( δφ − hµ)/β
(1 + t− βt)( δφ − hµ)/β + hµ
(29)
which with (9) gives m in (14) as required.
Notes on conjecture and local stability analysis
It is very difficult, if not impossible to say anything specific about the nature of trajectories
far from steady states. However, local analysis combined with numerical experiments provides
support for our global conjecture that the value of tmax required to avoid overshoot rises non-
linearly with hµ. Based on this idea, we examine the stability characteristics of the steady state
as a function of parameters, exactly as was done numerically in Figure 4. Here we will show
analytically that as hµ increases, tmax must increase nonlinearly to have a stabilizing effect. For
a 2 dimensional system, the eigenvalues are
λ =
Tr ±√Tr2 − 4D
2
(30)
where Tr is the trace and D is the determinant.
For our model in Section 2, the Jacobian, J(t, hµ), at the (nontrivial) fixed point is:
J(t, hµ) =

r
(
1− 2S∞(t,hµ)K
)
− rφαS∞(t,hµ)δA(t)
(
1− S∞(t,hµ)K
)
− δφ
φ
rφαS∞(t,hµ)
δA(t)
(
1− S∞(t,hµ)K
)
0
 (31)
so that
Tr ≡ Trace(t, hµ) = r
(
1− 2S∞(t, hµ)
K
)
− rφαS∞(t, hµ)
δA(t)
(
1− S∞(t, hµ)
K
)
(32)
and
D ≡ Det(t, hµ) = rφαS∞(t, hµ)
A(t)
(
1− S∞(t, hµ)
K
)
(33)
where
A(t) ≡ 1 + t(1− β)
β
. (34)
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The relative values of Tr and D determine the local behavior of the model (Boyce and
DiPrima, 1977). Of interest is the sign of the real parts of the eigenvalues (damping) and
whether they have nonzero imaginary parts (oscillations). Notice from expression (33) that the
D > 0 always, so that the equilibrium will be either a source or a sink. After substituting (12)
for S∞(t, hµ) in expression (32) and further manipulation, we arrive at
Tr(t, hµ) = r
{
−S∞(t, hµ)
K
+
hµφ
δ
(
1− 1
A(t)
)(
1− S∞(t, hµ)
K
)}
. (35)
Note that Tr(0, 0) < 0 so that with no tax and no subsistence (the BT model) the equilibrium
point is asymptotically stable. From this we can compute
∂Tr
∂hµ
= r
{
−∂S∞(t, hµ)
∂hµ
(
1
K
)
+
φ
δ
(
1− 1
A(t)
)(
1−
(
hµ
∂S∞(t, hµ)
∂hµ
+
S∞(t, hµ)
K
))}
(36)
which since ∂S∞(t,hµ)∂hµ < 0, A(t) > 1, and
S∞(t,hµ)
K < 1, is always positive. Thus, increasing hµ
increases Tr and thus has a destabilizing effect. The partial derivative of Tr with respect to t
is
∂Tr
∂t
=
r(1− β)
βαK
[−δ
φ
+
φhµ
δ
(
hµ +
(αK − hµ)
A2(t)
)]
. (37)
If hµ = 0, expression (37) implies that
∂Tr
∂t
=
−δr(1− β)
βαKφ
< 0. (38)
Thus increasing t reduces the trace and tends to stabilize the model. However, increasing hµ
weakens the ability of the tax to stabilize the model. Specifically, for 0 < hµ <
δ
φ
, if increasing
tax is to stabilize the model, the term in square brackets in (37) must be negative. This is true
if
t >
β
(
αK−hµ(
δ
φ
)2
1
hµ
−hµ
) 1
2
− 1
1− β . (39)
As hµ approaches
δ
φ
, the right hand side of expression (39) becomes arbitrarily large, thus the
tax required to have a local stabilizing effect can become arbitrarily large. The value of the
tax required to have a local stabilizing effect rises nonlinearly with the subsistence requirement.
Numerical experiments suggest that the global behavior of the model is roughly consistent with
this local result.
The change in D with respect to t is
∂D
∂t
=
rφ(1− β)
A(t)βK
[(
δ
φ
− hµ
)
(K − 2S∞(t, hµ))− 1
A(t)
(K − S∞(t, hµ))
]
. (40)
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The tax can have a stabilizing effect through reducing the determinant if the expression in the
square brackets is negative. Define
B(hµ) =
αK + 1− hµ −
√
(αK + 1− hµ)2 − 8(αK − hµ)
4
(
δ
φ − hµ
) , (41)
and
B(hµ) =
αK + 1− hµ +
√
(αK + 1− hµ)2 − 8(αK − hµ)
4
(
δ
φ − hµ
) . (42)
Then the tax will have a downward effect on D if
t <
βB(hµ)− 1
1− β or t >
βB(hµ)− 1
1− β . (43)
For the BT parameter set and hµ equal to 0 and 0.015 as in the examples, this condition is
t < 2.18 or t > 9.44, and t < 12.20 or t > 43.06, (44)
respectively. In our numerical experiments, the upper bounds on the tax of 1 and 3 for the
respective cases are well within the bounds where the tax has a stabilizing effect.
Finally,
∂D
∂hµ
=
rφ
A(t)
∂a
∂hµ
(
1− 2S∞(t, hµ)
K
)
. (45)
Increasing hµ will increase or decrease D depending on the sign of the expression in parenthesis.
With no tax, the right hand side of (45) is negative, thus increasing hµ can reduce D. However,
the imaginary parts of the eigenvalues depend on both the trace and the determinant. Increasing
hµ increases the trace (makes it less negative) and thus reduces its absolute value which can
more than offset the associated reduction in the determinant.
In summary, expressions (36) and (37) indicate that the subsistence requirement and tax
have opposing effects on local stability. A nonzero subsistence requirement increases the trace
and simultaneously weakens the effect a positive tax can have in countering this effect. Taxes
in the range relevant to the model reduce the determinant while hµ may increase or decrease
the the determinant depending on the tax. The effect of the subsistence requirement on the
trace is probably more important than its effect on the determinant. Although these results are
local, numerical experiments suggest the global behavior of the model is consistent with them.
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